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INTRODUCTION
At its inauguration in October 2012, the European Stability
Mechanism (“ESM”) was hailed by European political leaders
and top EU officials as a historic milestone in shaping the future
of the ailing Economic and Monetary Union (“EMU”). Set forth
in the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism
(“ESM Treaty” or “TESM”),1 the ESM was introduced to provide
stability support to euro area Member States experiencing severe
financing problems as a result of the ongoing sovereign debt
crisis. Apparently, those leaders and officials did not expect that
the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU” or “the
Court”), which still had to rule on the compatibility of the ESM
Treaty with the Union Treaties,2 would spoil their party. They
were right. The Pringle judgment,3 which followed less than two
months later, gave the ESM Treaty the final stamp of approval
and paved the way for new financial assistance programs.
The judgment is significant for several reasons. First and
foremost, the Court’s interpretation of the ‘no-bailout’ clause,4 a
key provision underpinning the EMU, has the practical effect of
authorizing future financial assistance by the ESM as well as
previously agreed programs currently in place under various
temporary financial assistance mechanisms.5 The Court
answered the fundamental question of whether Member States
are allowed under the Union Treaties to provide stability
support to each other. Also of practical relevance, it ruled that
the Union’s institutions—more specifically the European
Commission, the European Central Bank (“ECB”), and the
1. Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, Feb. 2, 2012,
[hereinafter TESM], available at http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/
582311/05-tesm2.en12.pdf.
2. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2012 O.J. C 326/13
[hereinafter TEU]; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, 2012 O.J. C 326/47 [hereinafter TFEU]. In this Article, these two
foundational treaties are referred to as the “Union Treaties.”
3. Thomas Pringle v. Gov’t of Ireland, Case C-370/12, [2012] E.C.R. I____
(delivered Nov. 27, 2012).
4. See TFEU, supra note 2, art. 125(1), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 99.
5. On this later point, see Vestert Borger, The ESM and the European Court’s
Predicament in Pringle, 14 GERMAN L.J. 113, 132 (2013).
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Court itself—could be ‘borrowed’ by the euro area Member
States within the context of the ESM.
The judgment also has constitutional significance.
Monetary policy for the euro area Member States is an exclusive
competence of the Union.6 Where the Union Treaties confer on
the Union such competence, only the Union may legislate and
adopt legally binding acts. The Member States are only allowed
to do so themselves if they are empowered by the Union or for
the implementation of Union acts.7 Yet, over the course of the
sovereign debt crisis, the Member States on several occasions
resorted to the adoption of legally binding acts, namely
international agreements, which have as their object the
enhancement or further development of the EMU. While the
Member States are required to coordinate their economic
policies within the Union,8 the Union Treaties leave them much
room to maneuver with regard to economic policy. However, it
is debatable whether Member States can still act through
‘ordinary’ international agreements in an area over which they
have transferred exclusive powers to the Union (i.e., the
Economic and Monetary Union). In order to avoid answering
this question, the Court had to draw a hard line between
monetary policy and economic policy. This raises questions as to
what extent the highly centralized Monetary Union and the
hitherto underdeveloped Economic Union are interrelated. In
light of the Pringle judgment it is perhaps more appropriate to
think of the EMU as an ‘Economic and/or Monetary Union.’
The judgment, furthermore, marks the first time the Court
was called upon to rule on the use of the simplified revision
procedure under article 48(6) of the Consolidated Version of
the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”), as introduced by the
Lisbon Treaty. The euro area Member States opted to establish
the ESM outside the framework of the Union Treaties. To
facilitate this move and take away doubts as to the compatibility
of the new stability mechanism with the ‘no-bailout’ clause, the
European Council agreed to add the following paragraph to
article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (“TFEU”):
6. TFEU, supra note 2, art. 3(1)(c), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 51.
7. Id. art. 2(1), at 50.
8. Id. arts. 2(3), 5(1), at 50, 52.
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3. The Member States whose currency is the euro may
establish a stability mechanism to be activated if
indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a
whole. The granting of any required financial assistance
under the mechanism will be made subject to strict
conditionality.9

This amendment had to be approved by all twenty-seven EU
Member States before it could enter into force, simultaneously
with the ESM Treaty, on January 1, 2013. However, in reaction
to increased market tensions,10 euro area leaders later resolved
to have the ESM Treaty enter into force by mid-2012. In Pringle,
the Court was asked whether the decision amending article 136
TFEU was valid and, if so, whether the ESM could actually be
established before the entry into force of that decision.
Section I of this Article will set out the factual and
procedural background of the case, which originated from a
request for a preliminary ruling by the Irish Supreme Court.
Section II will scrutinize the judgment with regard to the three
preliminary questions referred. It will contain an initial analysis
and provide context. Further commentary on specific elements
of the case can be found in Section III.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURE
On August 3, 2012, the Irish Supreme Court made a
reference for a preliminary ruling in proceedings brought by
Thomas Pringle, T.D., a member of the Irish Parliament.11
Mr. Pringle sought a declaration that the insertion of article
136(3) TFEU constitutes an unlawful amendment of the TFEU,
and also sought an injunction preventing Ireland from ratifying,
approving, or accepting the ESM Treaty. The reference
concerned the validity of the decision amending article 136
TFEU and the interpretation of various provisions of the Union
Treaties. A preliminary ruling was necessary for the Supreme
9. European Council Decision No. 2011/199/EU (Amending Art. 136 TFEU), 2011
O.J. L 91/1.
10. See Statement by the Euro Area Heads of State or Government, Brussels
European Council—9 December 2011, EUR. COUNCIL, 67 (Jan. 2012), available at
http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/555285/qcao11001enc.pdf.
11. For the application, see 2012 O.J. C 303/18. The preliminary reference
procedure is laid down in article 267 TFEU, supra note 2, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 164.
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Court to assess whether Ireland would breach its obligations
under EU law by adopting and ratifying the ESM Treaty.
Considering the matter to be one of exceptional urgency, the
Supreme Court requested the CJEU to apply an accelerated
procedure.12 It offered that the timely ratification of the ESM
Treaty by Ireland was of the utmost importance to the other
Contracting Parties, especially those in need of financial
assistance.13 In reality, the other Contracting Parties could have
easily proceeded without Ireland,14 although that would have
undermined the credibility of the new stability mechanism. It
did not come that far, however, as the Supreme Court declined
to grant an injunction restraining Ireland from ratifying the
ESM Treaty. Thereby it also effectively ruled out the possibility
of an Irish referendum on the matter.15
All Contracting Parties subsequently ratified the ESM
Treaty. A major hurdle in this respect was overcome when the
German Federal Constitutional Court (“GFCC”) ruled that
Germany, the largest contributor to the ESM’s capital stock,
could proceed with the ratification. Shortly thereafter, on
September 27, 2012, the ESM Treaty entered into force.
Nonetheless, by order of the President of the CJEU of October
4, 2012, the request of the Irish Supreme Court was granted so
as to remove as soon as possible any uncertainty as to the validity
of the ESM Treaty, “which adversely affects the objective of the
12. See Protocol (No. 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European
Union art. 23a, 2012 O.J. C 326/210, at 216. In the judgment, the Court referred to
article 105(1)—formerly article 104a—of the Rules of Procedure of September 25,
2012, 2012 O.J. C 337/1, which entered into force on November 1, 2012.
13. Order of the President of the Court, Case C-370/12, ¶¶ 1–5 (Oct. 4, 2012).
14. Article 48 of the TESM, supra note 1, stipulates that the ESM Treaty enters
into force upon ratification by Contracting Parties representing 90% of the total
subscriptions to the ESM’s authorized capital stock. Since Ireland’s contribution
amounts to less than 1.6% thereof, the Supreme Court may have been overly generous
in its assessment of this particular Member State’s influence on European affairs. In
fact, only Germany, Spain, France, and Italy retained their power to ‘veto’ the ESM
Treaty.
15. The applicant had argued that the participation by the Irish Government in
the adoption and ratification of the ESM Treaty was contrary to the Constitution of
Ireland and called for a referendum on the issue. As may be remembered, Ireland has
a history of difficult referendums on major European Treaties which impact its
Constitution. See, e.g., JEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS, THE LISBON TREATY: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS 49, 51 & n.81 (2010). For the judgment, see Thomas Pringle v. Ireland,
[2012] IESC 47, Record No. 339/2012 (Ir.).
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ESM Treaty, namely to maintain the financial stability of the
euro area.”16 On October 23, 2012, therefore, a host of Member
States and three EU institutions, displaying a seldom-seen unity,
lined up in Luxembourg to defend the newly established crisis
resolution mechanism. This demonstrates that they deemed the
ESM of crucial importance not just for the euro area, but for the
Union as a whole.
The ESM is an international financial institution with full
legal personality, established by the euro area Member States
under public international law.17 It assumes the tasks previously
fulfilled by the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism
(“EFSM”) and the European Financial Stability Facility
(“EFSF”), two temporary financial assistance mechanisms
devised in May 2010 as part of a “comprehensive package of
measures to preserve financial stability in Europe.”18 These
mechanisms go hand in hand with recent efforts to reinforce
economic governance within the euro area. In fact, the granting
of financial assistance under the ESM has been made
conditional on the ratification of the so-called Fiscal Compact
Treaty19 by the ESM Member concerned.20 Since critics of
previous euro rescue measures21 had questioned their
compatibility with the ‘no-bailout’ clause, the Member States
16. Order of the President of the Court, supra note 13, ¶¶ 6–7.
17. TESM, supra note 1, arts. 1(1) 32(2)
18. Press Release 9596/10 (Presse 108), Council of the European Union,
Extraordinary Council Meeting (May 9, 2010). The European Financial Stability
Mechanism (“EFSM”) was established by a Regulation based on article 122(2) TFEU,
supra note 2, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 98. It allows the European Commission to contract on
behalf of the Union borrowings on the capital markets or with financial institutions up
to EU€60 billion under an EU budget guarantee. See Council Regulation No.
407/2010/EU on Establishing a European Financial Stabilization Mechanism, 2010
O.J. L 118/1 [hereinafter EFSM Regulation]. The European Financial Stability Facility
(“EFSF”) covers the remaining EU€440 billion of the agreed package. The facility takes
the form of a special purpose vehicle. It was established as a public limited liability
company governed by Luxembourgish private law, owned by the euro area Member
States. See European Financial Stability Facility, Société Anonyme, Journal Officiel du
Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, June 8, 2010, Memorial C–No. 1189, at 57026.
19. Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and
Monetary Union, March 2, 2012 [hereinafter Fiscal Compact Treaty], available at
http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/media/304649/st00tscg26_en12.pdf.
20. See Preamble to TESM, supra note 1.
21. See, e.g., Lothar Knopp, Griechenland—Nothilfe auf dem Verfassungsrechtlichen
Prüfstand, 63 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1777 (2010); Matthias Ruffert, The
European Debt Crisis and European Union Law, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1777 (2011).
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agreed that a permanent ‘bailout fund’ (as the envisaged ESM
was labeled by non-believers) would need a more solid
grounding in the Union Treaties to withstand future challenges
before the courts. However, their decision to amend article 136
TFEU via a new simplified revision procedure, less than a year
after the troubled entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, only
added fuel to the fire.
The Irish Supreme Court referred three questions to the
CJEU.22 It sought to ascertain, firstly, whether European Council
Decision 2011/199 is valid insofar as it amends article 136 TFEU
by providing for the insertion, on the basis of the simplified
revision procedure under article 48(6) TEU, of a third
paragraph relating to the establishment of the ESM. Secondly,
the Supreme Court sought to ascertain whether articles 2, 3,
4(3), and 13 TEU, and articles 2(3), 3(1)(c), 3(2), 119 to 123,
and 125 to 127 TFEU, and the general principles of effective
judicial protection and legal certainty, preclude a euro area
Member State from concluding and ratifying an agreement such
as the ESM Treaty. Thirdly, it asked whether said Member States
may conclude and ratify the ESM Treaty before the entry into
force of the aforementioned European Council Decision.
Mr. Pringle argued before the CJEU that participation by
euro area Member States in the ESM Treaty is incompatible with
their obligations under article 125 TFEU. He stated that the
European Council had correctly assessed that an amendment of
the Union Treaties would be necessary to permit a permanent
stability mechanism, but submitted that the rule of law requires
that the amendment take effect before said mechanism is
established. Mr. Pringle further disputed the chosen procedure
for the amendment; fundamental changes to the EU legal
order, he argued, cannot be adopted using a simplified revision
procedure.

22. Given that the highest courts of the Member States are under an obligation to
refer questions on the interpretation of the Union Treaties and the validity and
interpretation of acts of the Union’s institutions to the Court of Justice of the European
Union (“CJEU”), the German Federal Constitutional Court should have already
brought the matter before the Court.
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II. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
Little over a month after the hearing, sitting as a full Court
of twenty-seven judges for the first time in a preliminary
reference procedure, the CJEU confirmed the validity of the
decision amending article 136 TFEU and the compatibility of
the ESM Treaty with EU law. In this section, the three
preliminary questions will be discussed in their original order.
A. Question 1: The Validity of the Decision Amending Article 136
TFEU
The European Council, the Commission, and several
intervening Member States contested the jurisdiction of the
CJEU to examine the first preliminary question concerning the
validity of the decision amending article 136 TFEU. They
contended that the Court has no power under article 267 TFEU
to assess the validity of provisions of primary EU law.23 However,
as the Court argued, while it is true that the decision concerns
the insertion of a new provision of primary law, the question of
validity concerns an act of one of the Union’s institutions,
namely the European Council. Therefore, whenever the
European Council uses the simplified revision procedure under
article 48(6) TEU, it falls to the Court to verify firstly that the
procedural rules laid down in article 48(6) TEU were followed,
and, secondly, subject to the third paragraph thereof, that the
amendments decided upon concern only Part Three of the
TFEU.24
The Court first examined whether the amendment
envisaged by the decision concerns solely provisions of Part
Three of the TFEU on the Union’s policies and internal actions.
This may seem like an easy puzzle to solve. After all, article 136
TFEU is to be found in Part Three of the TFEU and thus
formally satisfies the first condition laid down in article 48(6)
TEU. However, the Irish Supreme Court also sought to ascertain
whether the decision encroaches on the Union’s competence in
23. Thomas Pringle v. Gov’t of Ireland, Case C-370/12, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 30
(delivered Nov. 27, 2012).
24. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 35 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012). For a closer
analysis, see View of Advocate General Kokott, Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 18–33
(delivered Oct. 26, 2012).
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the area of monetary policy and in the area of the coordination
of the economic policies of the Member States.
The CJEU concluded that the decision was not capable of
affecting the Union’s exclusive competence in the area of
monetary policy as laid down in article 3(1)(c) TFEU. If it had
ruled otherwise, this would have made the use of the simplified
revision procedure unlawful. Since article 3(1)(c) TFEU is to be
found in Part One of the TFEU, the amendment envisaged by
the decision could in that event only have been adopted by
using the more cumbersome ordinary revision procedure.25 The
Court, however, found, in light of the objectives to be attained
by the ESM,26 the instruments provided to achieve those
objectives, and the close link between the ESM and the TFEU
provisions relating to economic policy and the regulatory
framework for strengthened economic governance of the Union
(i.e., the ‘Six-Pack’),27 that the establishment of the ESM falls
within the area of economic policy.28 Indeed, Mr. Pringle could
have guessed this simply by studying the TFEU more closely.
The legal basis for Union financial assistance to Member States
facing severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or
exceptional occurrences29 can be found in Chapter 1 of Title
VIII, entitled ‘Economic Policy.’ Still, it is useful that the Court
clarified this point with additional arguments. Mr. Pringle’s
claim that financial assistance under the ESM is essentially
25. TEU, supra note 2, arts. 48(2)–(5), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 42.
26. According to the Court, the objective pursued by the ESM, which is to
safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, is clearly distinct from the primary
objective of the Union’s monetary policy under articles 127(1) and 282(2) TFEU to
maintain price stability. See Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 56 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012).
27. The term ‘Six-Pack’ refers to a set of secondary EU law measures that entered
into force on December 13, 2011. See Council Regulation No. 1173/2011/EU on the
Effective Enforcement of Budgetary Surveillance in the Euro Area, 2011 O.J. L 306/1;
Council Regulation No. 1174/2011/EU on Enforcement Measures to Correct Excessive
Macroeconomic Imbalances in the Euro Area, 2011 O.J. L 306/8; Council Regulation
No. 1175/2011/EU on the Strengthening of the Surveillance and Coordination of
Economic Policies (amending Regulation No. 1466/97/EC), 2011 O.J. L 306/12;
Council Regulation No. 1176/2011/EU on the Prevention and Correction of
Macroeconomic Imbalances, 2011 O.J. L 306/25; Council Regulation No.
1177/2011/EU on Speeding Up and Clarifying the Implementation of the Excessive
Deficit Procedure (amending Regulation No. 1467/97/EC), 2011 O.J. L 306/33;
Council Directive 2011/85/EU on Requirements for Budgetary Frameworks of the
Member States, 2011 O.J. L 306/41.
28. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 60 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012). .
29. TFEU, supra note 2, art. 122(2), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 98.
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monetary in character was rightly dismissed. An economic policy
measure, the Court stated, cannot be treated as equivalent to a
monetary policy measure for the sole reason that it may have
indirect effects on the stability of the single currency.30
Next, the Court made a crucial observation on the division
of competences in the area of economic policy. Since articles
2(3) and 5(1) TFEU, according to the Court, restrict the role of
the Union to the adoption of coordinating measures, the Union
Treaties “do not confer any specific power on the Union to
establish a stability mechanism of the kind envisaged by Decision
2011/199.”31 The Court conceded that article 122(2) TFEU
confers on the Union the power to grant ad hoc financial
assistance to individual Member States. It considered that article
122(2) TFEU is nevertheless not an appropriate legal basis for
the establishment of a permanent stability mechanism, the
objectives of which are to safeguard the stability of the euro area
as a whole.32 Accordingly, the Court ruled, the euro area Member
States are entitled to conclude between themselves an
agreement such as the ESM Treaty, provided they do not
disregard their duty to comply with EU law.33 It thus follows that
the decision satisfies the condition laid down in article 48(6)
TEU that an amendment of the TFEU by means of the

30. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 56 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012). The Court’s
statement reflects the view of Advocate General (“AG”) Kokott, who added that to hold
otherwise would lead to the conclusion that economic policy would in its entirety be
reserved to the European System of Central Banks (“ESCB”). The rules of the TFEU
on the coordination of economic policy would thereby be devoid of meaning. See View
of Advocate General Kokott, Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 85 (delivered Oct. 26,
2012)
31. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 64 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012) (emphasis added).
32. Id. ¶ 65. Note that the Court here discreetly settled a disagreement between
the President of the Commission and the other Members of the European Council.
The European Council Conclusions of December 16–17, 2010, which formally
announced that a permanent stability mechanism would be established to safeguard
the stability of the euro area as a whole, state that the European Council agreed that
article 122(2) TFEU would no longer be needed for such purposes. See Eur. Council,
Conclusions of December 16–17, 2010, at 1 (Jan. 2011), available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/
118578.pdf. The Conclusions also affirm that the Heads of State or Government agreed
that article 122(2) TFEU should therefore not be used for such purposes. See id. This
implies that the President of the Commission was of the opinion that article 122(2)
TFEU could be used as a legal basis.
33. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 68–69 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012).
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simplified revision procedure may concern only Part Three of
that Treaty.34
B. Question 2: The Compatibility of the ESM Treaty with EU Law
With the second preliminary question the Irish Supreme
Court sought to ascertain whether various articles in the Union
Treaties,35 as well as the general principles of effective judicial
protection and legal certainty, preclude the euro area Member
States from concluding and ratifying an agreement such as the
ESM Treaty.36
1. Compatibility with the ‘No-Bailout’ Clause of Article 125
TFEU
Surely the most eagerly anticipated part of the judgment
was the Court’s interpretation of the ‘no-bailout’ clause laid
down in article 125(1) TFEU. The question was essentially
whether the stability support by the ESM and the rules relating
to capital calls are ‘bailouts’ captured by article 125 TFEU.37 The
length of the answer provided by Advocate General (“AG”)
Kokott—roughly a third of her View—reflects the difficult
position in which both she and the Court found themselves.38
On the basis of the wording of article 125 TFEU, the Court
found that the ‘no-bailout’ clause was not intended to prohibit
all forms of financial assistance by the Union or the Member
States.39 If that were the case, the Court explained, article 122(2)
TFEU, which allows the Union to grant ad hoc financial
assistance, would have had to state that it derogated from article
125 TFEU.40 Indeed, as has been argued in the literature, a
34. Id. ¶ 70.
35. For the full list of articles, see supra Section I.
36. The second question was ruled partly inadmissible insofar as it concerned the
interpretation of articles 2 and 3 TEU and the general principle of legal certainty. See
Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 82–91 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012).
37. See View of Advocate General Kokott, Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 101–03
(delivered Oct. 26, 2012).
38. Id. ¶¶ 104–66. Unlike the Court, AG Kokott carefully sets out why she
considers ESM financial assistance to fall within the personal scope of article 125(1)
TFEU, which is not addressed to an independent international organization such as the
ESM. See id. ¶¶ 106–12.
39. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 130 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012).
40. Id. ¶ 131.
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broad interpretation of article 125 TFEU would render article
122(2) TFEU meaningless.41 Since the stricter wording of article
123 TFEU also supports the view that the ‘no-bailout’ clause
does not completely prohibit financial assistance, the Court
proceeded by examining which forms of financial assistance are
compatible with article 125 TFEU having regard to the objective
thereof.42
The Court found that article 125 TFEU only prohibits the
Union and the Member States from granting financial assistance
that diminishes the incentive of the recipient Member State to
conduct a sound budgetary policy.43 It argued that the ‘nobailout’ clause “ensures that Member States remain subject to
the logic of the market when they enter into debt, since that
ought to prompt them to maintain budgetary discipline.”44 The
important disciplinary pressure of market forces on the
borrowing activities of the Member States was identified as the
objective of the ‘no-bailout’ clause early on.45 The Court
identified, however, a higher objective. Compliance with
budgetary discipline, it held, contributes to the attainment of
the financial stability of the monetary union. In a nod to the
ECB,46 the Court determined that financial assistance by the
ESM is not compatible with article 125 TFEU unless it is
indispensable for the safeguarding of the financial stability as a
whole and subject to strict conditions.47
41. Jean-Victor Louis, Guest Editorial, The No-Bailout Clause and Rescue Packages, 47
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 971, 983–84 (2010) (citing Ulrich Häde, Haushaltsdisziplin und
Solidarität im Zeichen des Finanzkrise, 20 EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 399 (2009)).
42. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 132–33 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012). See also
View of Advocate General Kokott, Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 141 (delivered Oct.
26, 2012).
43. Id. ¶ 136.
44. Id. ¶ 135.
45. Jörn Pipkorn, Legal Arrangements in the Treaty of Maastricht for the Effectiveness of
the Economic and Monetary Union, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 263, 275 (1994).
46. The Court referenced the Opinion of the ECB of March 17, 2011, on the
Draft Decision Amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union with Regard to a Stability Mechanism for Member States whose Currency is the
Euro (CON/2011/24), 2011 O.J. C 140/8, ¶ 5. With this little nod, the Court found a
smart way to reconstruct the scope of article 125 TFEU with the use of the terminology
found in article 136(3) TFEU without actually having to refer to the yet-to-be-inserted
provision itself.
47. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 136 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012).
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To get to this conclusion, the Court did something quite
remarkable. Likely inspired by AG Kokott,48 the Court referred
to the preparatory work relating to the Maastricht Treaty to
support its finding that the aim of article 125 TFEU is to ensure
that the Member States follow a sound budgetary policy.49 It is
certainly not uncommon to have recourse to the travaux
préparatoires of a treaty as a supplementary means of
interpretation under international law,50 or for that matter in
the national context. However, one hardly ever encounters it in
the context of primary EU law. Still, this unusual move should
not be seen as a strained way of justifying a predetermined
outcome. Rather, by emphasizing the original intent of the
drafters of the Maastricht Treaty (i.e., the Member States), the
Court added legitimacy to its seemingly novel interpretation of
the ‘no-bailout’ clause.
The Court’s overall conclusion was that article 125 TFEU
does not prohibit the Member States from granting financial
assistance to each other via the ESM. It considered that grants of
financial assistance by way of credit lines or loans51 do not imply
that the ESM will assume the debts of a recipient ESM Member,
but amounts to the creation of new debt. It pointed out that a
recipient ESM Member remains responsible for its commitments
to its creditors with respect to its existing debt.52 Other stability
support facilities such as the purchase of bonds on the primary
and secondary markets,53 too, do not lead the ESM to assume
the debts of a recipient ESM Member.54 Therefore, at least from
48. See View of Advocate General Kokott, Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 128–31
(delivered Oct. 26, 2012).
49. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 135 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012). Both the AG and
the Court point out that the prohibition contained in article 125 TFEU finds its origin
in article 104b of the Treaty establishing the European Community, as inserted by the
Maastricht Treaty in November 1993. See View of Advocate General Kokott, Pringle,
[2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 128 (delivered Oct. 26, 2012); Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶
134 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012).
50. See 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. Note that such interpretation is understood to be
complementary to the general rule of interpretation, as laid down in article 31 VCLT.
See generally MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF TREATIES 446–48 (2009).
51. TESM, supra note 1, arts. 14–16.
52. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 139 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012).
53. TESM, supra note 1, arts. 17, 18.
54. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 140–41 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012).
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a legal perspective, the ESM will not act as the guarantor of the
debts of that ESM Member. It thus follows that article 125 TFEU
does not preclude the conclusion or ratification of the ESM
Treaty by the euro area Member States.55
2. Compatibility with Exclusive Union Competences in the Area
of Monetary Policy and Under Article 3(2) TFEU
The ECB and the central banks of the euro area Member
States, which together constitute the Eurosystem, conduct the
Union’s monetary policy.56 In carrying out this exclusive
competence, their objective is to maintain price stability.57
Repeating its earlier findings, the Court dismissed the
applicant’s claim that the activities of the ESM affect price
stability in the euro area and therefore encroach upon the
Union’s monetary policy. The TFEU provisions relating to the
Union’s exclusive competence,58 the Court held, do not
preclude the conclusion or ratification of the ESM Treaty.59
As the preamble of the ESM Treaty states that the ESM will
assume the tasks currently fulfilled by the EFSF and EFSM,60 the
Irish Supreme Court inquired whether the Union’s competence
under article 3(2) TFEU precludes the euro area Member States
from concluding or ratifying the ESM Treaty. That provision
stipulates that the Union shall have exclusive competence to
conclude international agreements when the conclusion thereof
may affect common rules or alter their scope.61 The Court

55. As was noted above, Mr. Pringle also claimed that the rules related to capital
calls are caught by the prohibition of article 125 TFEU. The Court dismissed this claim,
pointing out that in accordance with article 25(2) TESM, a defaulting ESM Member
remains bound to pay its part of the capital. The other ESM Members thus do not act
as guarantors of the debt of that ESM Member. See Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 145
(delivered Nov. 27, 2012); cf. View of Advocate General Kokott, Pringle, [2012] E.C.R.
I____, ¶¶ 161–65 (delivered Oct. 26, 2012).
56. TFEU, supra note 2, art. 282(1), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 167; Protocol (No. 4) on
the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central
Bank, 2012 O.J. C 326/230, at 230 (annexed to the Union Treaties art. 1).
57. TFEU, supra note 2, arts. 127(1), 282(2), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 102, 167.
58. Id. arts. 3(1)(c), 127, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 51, 102.
59. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 93–98 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012).
60. See Preamble to TESM, supra note 1.
61. Article 3(2) TFEU reads as follows: “The Union shall also have exclusive
competence for the conclusion of an international agreement when its conclusion is
provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to
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considered that since the EFSF was established outside the
Union framework, the assumption of its tasks by the ESM in any
event cannot have such effects. Nor does the conclusion or
ratification of the ESM Treaty jeopardize the objective pursued
by article 122(2) TFEU or the EFSM Regulation.62 Therefore,
the Court stressed once more that the TFEU does not confer a
specific power on the Union to establish a permanent stability
mechanism.63 The Union, it argued, is furthermore not
prevented by the establishment of the ESM from granting ad hoc
financial assistance to Member States under article 122(2)
TFEU.64
3. Compatibility with Union Competences in the Area of
Economic Policy and the Prohibition of Monetary Financing
Mr. Pringle had suggested that the conditions attached to
financial assistance granted by the ESM serve the same function
as the Council recommendations under articles 121 and 126
TFEU, and therefore unlawfully encroach on Union
competence.65 Those conditions, the Court explained, may very
well take the form of macro-economic adjustment programs, but
they do not constitute an instrument for the coordination of the
economic policies of the Member States, as do the provisions
mentioned above. It stated that these conditions are instead
intended to ensure that the activities of the ESM are consistent
with EU law.66 The ESM Treaty indeed expressly provides that
the Memorandum of Understanding (“MoU”) detailing the
conditionality attached to the financial assistance granted to an
ESM Member is fully consistent with the measures of economic
policy coordination in the TFEU.67 Coordination of the
exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or
alter their scope.” TFEU, supra note 2, art. 3(2), O.J. 2012 C 326, at 51 (emphasis added).
62. See supra note 18.
63. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 105 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012) (referring to
paragraphs 64 to 66).
64. Id. ¶¶ 104, 106.
65. View of Advocate General Kokott, Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 89 (delivered
Oct. 26, 2012).
66. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 108–12, 114 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012).
67. As one of the European Council’s agents in the Pringle case has put it (writing
in a personal capacity), the objective of the provision of consistency found in article
13(3) TESM is “to avoid building a rival universe of economic coordination outside the
EU Treaties.” See Alberto de Gregorio Merino, Legal Developments in the Economic and
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economic policies of the Member States via the ESM is out of
the question, as AG Kokott clarified, “for the simple reason that
the conditions represent the requirements of the ESM as
imposed on an individual Member State and not a
harmonization of the individual economic policies of the
Member States.”68
The AG is right. While the ESM and other financial
assistance mechanisms go hand in hand with strengthened
economic policy coordination,69 they were certainly not
designed for that purpose. Her choice of wording is noteworthy,
though. With the phrase “imposed on an individual Member
State,” the AG openly suggests recipient Member States may
have little choice but to accept the far-reaching austerity
measures demanded by the “Troika” composed of the European
Commission, the ECB, and the International Monetary Fund
(“IMF”). As such, it is probably an apt description of the
political reality of negotiations between creditor and recipient
Member States.70
In relation to article 122(2) TFEU, the Irish Supreme Court
asked whether that provision exhaustively defines the
exceptional circumstances in which it is possible to grant
financial assistance to Member States and whether it empowers
solely the Union’s institutions to grant financial assistance.71 Mr.
Pringle argued that the ESM encroaches on the Union’s
competence to grant financial assistance under article 122(2)
TFEU. In his view, financial assistance via the ESM goes beyond
the conditions set out in that provision. Article 122(2) TFEU
holds that the Council may grant financial assistance if a
Monetary Union During the Debt Crisis: The Mechanisms of Financial Assistance, 49 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 1613, 1635–36 (2012). Even without such provisions, though, EU law
would of course prevail in case of conflict on the basis of the principle of primacy of EU
law.
68. View of Advocate General Kokott, Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 92 (delivered
Oct. 26, 2012).
69. See, e.g., Preamble to TESM, supra note 1.
70. View of Advocate General Kokott, Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 92 (delivered
Oct. 26, 2012). The official reading is of course that the European Commission (on
behalf of the ESM), in liaison with the ECB and, wherever possible, together with the
IMF, and the Member State concerned negotiate the Memorandum of Understanding
(“MoU”) detailing the conditionality attached to stability support. This implies equality
of the negotiating partners. Cf. TESM, supra note 1, art. 13(3).
71. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 117 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012).

2013]

THE PRINGLE JUDGMENT

127

Member State faces severe difficulties caused by natural disasters
or exceptional occurrences beyond its control. Thus, only the Union
may grant financial assistance—not the Member States or the
ESM—and only in the event that the difficulties faced by the
recipient Member State are exceptional and unforeseeable in
nature. Budgetary difficulties or financing problems, argued Mr.
Pringle, do not fall under that category.72 In this regard, it
should be mentioned that the EFSM Regulation explicitly
characterized the sovereign debt crisis as such an exceptional
situation, caused by the global financial crisis.73 The ESM Treaty
does not. However, the controversy surrounding the legal basis
of the EFSM Regulation appears to have been the main reason
why the Member States decided to amend article 136 TFEU.74
The Court did not answer the Irish Supreme Court’s first
question concerning article 122(2) TFEU. Instead, in answering
the second question, it drew a clear distinction between
financial assistance granted by the Union and financial
assistance granted by the Member States (via the ESM). As the
establishment of the ESM does not affect the Union’s exercise of
competence and nothing in article 122 TFEU indicates that the
Union has exclusive competence to grant financial assistance to a
Member State, the Court found that the Member States remain
free to establish a stability mechanism such as the ESM.75 This is
subject to the proviso that the ESM in its operation complies
with EU law, as the Court had already settled.76
The Irish Supreme Court had asked, furthermore, whether
the ESM Treaty was not in reality intended to circumvent the
prohibition of monetary financing found in article 123 TFEU.77
Again, the CJEU noted that the provision concerned is not
addressed to the Member States. Because article 123 TFEU is

72. Written observations of Thomas Pringle in Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v.
Gov’t of Ireland, ¶ 3.39 (on file with the author).
73. EFSM Regulation, supra note 18, pmbl.
74. Bruno de Witte, The European Treaty Amendment for the Creation of a Financial
Stability Mechanism, SIEPS EUR. POLICY ANALYSIS, June 2011, at 6. On the use of article
122.2 TFEU as the legal basis for the EFSM Regulation, see, for example, Kaarlo Tuori,
The European Financial Crisis—Constitutional Aspects and Implications 28 (Eur. Univ. Inst.
Working Paper Law No. 2012/28), and the literature cited therein.
75. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 118–21 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012).
76. Id. ¶ 121 (referring to ¶¶ 68–69, 111–13).
77. Id. ¶ 124.
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specifically addressed to the ECB and the national central banks,
the grant of financial assistance by a group of Member States is
simply not covered by the prohibition. The euro area Member
States are thus not “circumventing” article 123 TFEU when they
act via the ESM, the Court explained, because they are not
derogating from the prohibition laid down in that article.78 The
Court added that there is currently no basis for the view that the
funds provided to the ESM might be derived from financial
instruments prohibited by article 123(1) TFEU.79 This short
statement will surely inform ongoing discussions about the
possibility of granting the ESM a banking license, which would
allow it to borrow from the ECB and therefore significantly
bolster the ESM’s firepower. For the moment, it remains unclear
whether that would be consistent with article 123(1) TFEU in
the eyes of the Court.80
4. The Allocation of New Tasks to the European Commission
and the ECB
As was the case with the Greek Loan Facility and the EFSF,
the ESM ‘borrows’ the European Commission and the ECB.81
For that reason, the Irish Supreme Court asked whether the
allocation of new tasks to these institutions is compatible with
their respective powers. Besides taking part in the meetings of
the ESM’s Board of Governors and Board of Directors as
observers,82 the Commission and the ECB carry out executive
tasks as part of the Troika (together with the IMF). They are
entrusted to assess requests for stability support by ESM
Members,83 assess the urgency thereof,84 negotiate the MoU
78. Id. ¶¶ 125–26.
79. Id. ¶ 127.
80. See Pieter-Augustijn van Malleghem, Pringle: A Paradigm Shift in the European
Union’s Monetary Constitution, 14 GERMAN L. J. 141, 159 (2013).
81. To this end, the twenty-seven Member States, via an executive agreement
under international law, by common accord authorized the euro area Member States to
request the Commission and the ECB to perform the tasks set out in the ESM Treaty.
See Preamble to TESM, supra note 1; Council Document 12114/11, Decision of the
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of the European Union (June 24,
2011), available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st12/st12114.
en11.pdf.
82. TESM, supra note 1, arts. 5(3), 6(2).
83. Id. art. 13(1).
84. Id. art. 4(4).
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detailing the conditionality attached to financial assistance,85
and monitor compliance with that conditionality.86 Such use of
the institutions outside the framework of the Union Treaties is
certainly not unprecedented. In fact, the Court had previously
held that the Member States are not precluded from entrusting
management and coordination tasks to the institutions in areas
of non-exclusive competence.87
Those tasks, however, must be compatible with the powers
conferred by the Union Treaties and may not alter their
essential character. To put it differently, the Member States are
allowed to allocate new tasks to the institutions as long as their
competences, as defined by the Union Treaties, remain
unchanged. Since the objective of the ESM Treaty is to ensure
the financial stability of the euro area as a whole, the Court held,
the Commission’s involvement in the ESM Treaty promotes the
general interest of the Union and therefore complies with the
Court’s case law.88 Similarly, by virtue of its duties within the
ESM, the ECB supports the general economic policies in the
Union, the Court argued. Therefore, the tasks allocated to the
ECB under the ESM Treaty are compatible with its tasks under
the Union Treaties.89
5. The Jurisdiction of the Court to Decide on ESM-Related
Disputes
The Court’s assessment of its own jurisdiction to decide on
disputes in connection with the interpretation and application
of the ESM Treaty, under article 37(3) thereof, is one of the less
convincing parts of the judgment. Article 273 TFEU, on which
the Court’s jurisdiction is directly based,90 holds that it shall have
jurisdiction in any dispute between Member States relating to
85. Id. art. 13(3).
86. Id. art. 13(7).
87. Parliament v. Council and Commission (Bangladesh), Joined Cases C-181/91 &
C-248/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-3685; Parliament v. Council (Lomé IV Convention), Case C316/91, [1994] E.C.R. I-625.
88. Thomas Pringle v. Gov’t of Ireland, Case C-370/12, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶
163–64 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012); cf. TEU, supra note 2, art. 17(1), 2012 O.J. C 326, at
25.
89. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 165 (delivered November 27, 2012); cf. TFEU,
supra note 2, art. 282(2), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 167.
90. See Preamble to TESM, supra note 1.
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the subject matter of the Union Treaties if the dispute is
submitted to the Court under a special agreement.91 The link
with EU law is undeniable. Yet, article 37(2) TESM distinguishes
two types of disputes: those between ESM Members and those
between an ESM Member and the ESM itself. Given that the
ESM is an independent international organization, this second
category—formally at least—does not easily fit the description
‘between Member States.’
As becomes clear from article 37(3) TESM, disputes of the
second category occur when an ESM Member contests a
decision of the Board of Governors, an organ of the ESM acting
by qualified majority.92 Legally speaking, the Court’s assertion
that a dispute to which the ESM is a party can be considered to
be a ‘dispute between Member States’ since membership of the
ESM consists solely of EU Member States may not be entirely
correct. It is noteworthy in this respect that the Member States
themselves were initially unsure whether this type of dispute
would fit the wording of article 273 TFEU, as is demonstrated by
article 16(2) of the EFSF Framework Agreement.93 That
provision, too, distinguishes disputes between euro area
Member States only and disputes between the euro area
Member States and the EFSF, the ESM’s direct predecessor.
Disputes of the latter category are to be submitted to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of Luxembourg—not the
CJEU.94 Therefore, a more thorough reasoning by the Court
would have been welcome.
Be that as it may, the Court’s pragmatic approach here
obviously aims at preserving the autonomy of the EU legal
system and is therefore preferable over a strict reading of article
91. According to the Court, given the objective pursued by article 273 TFEU, such
agreement can be given in advance with reference to a whole class of predefined
disputes, in casu by means of article 37(3) TESM. See Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 172
(delivered November 27, 2012).
92. TESM, supra note 1, arts. 4(5), 5(7)(m). This makes a decision on a dispute
distinct from instances in which the Member States collectively exercise their powers
under public international law.
93. The EFSF Framework Agreement of June 7, 2010, is an agreement concluded
between the EFSF and the euro area Member States as shareholders of the EFSF.
94. Article 16(2) of the EFSF Framework Agreement provides that a dispute
arising from or in the context of the Agreement, to the extent it constitutes a dispute
between euro area Member States only, shall be submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the CJEU. No mention is made, however, of article 273 TFEU.
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273 TFEU. That provision should be read in conjunction with
article 344 TFEU, which obliges Member States not to submit
disputes on the interpretation or application of the Union
Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided
for therein.95 As such, articles 273 and 344 TFEU were
specifically designed to protect the unity of EU law and the
interpretation thereof. Since the ESM’s Board of Governors is de
facto just another ‘guise’ of the euro area Member States closely
connected to the Eurogroup,96 and the ESM Treaty is
inextricably linked with the EMU, the Court is in the best
position to adjudicate ESM-related disputes.
C. Question 3: The Legal (In)Significance of Article 136(3) TFEU
The Court’s answer to the third preliminary question might
appear remarkably brief, even cryptic. But, to be fair, the answer
was rather obvious. The Irish Supreme Court essentially asked
whether the euro area Member States were allowed to conclude
and ratify the ESM Treaty prior to the entry into force of the
decision amending article 136 TFEU. In December 2010, as Mr.
Pringle of course pointed out, the European Council explicitly
stated that the TFEU “should be amended in order for a
permanent mechanism to be established” by the euro area
Member States.97 However, when the hearings in Luxembourg
took place, the ESM had recently been inaugurated.98

95. On this obligation, see Commission v. Ireland (Mox Plant), Case C-459/03,
[2006] E.C.R. I-4642.
96. Meetings of the Board of Governors usually take place in the margin of
Eurogroup meetings, which are itself informal meetings scheduled ahead of regular
Economic and Financial Affairs Council (“ECOFIN”) meetings. The Chairman of the
Board of Governors is currently Dutch Finance Minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem, who is
also the President of the Eurogroup.
97. European Council 16–17 Dec. 2010 Conclusions, supra note 32, at 1. Note that
European Council Decision 2011/199 does not refer to the aforementioned statement,
but to the European Council of October 28-29, 2010, at which the Heads of State or
Government agreed on the need to establish a permanent crisis mechanism and invited
President Van Rompuy to undertake consultations with the members of the European
Council on “a limited treaty change to that effect.” Id.
98. The ESM Treaty entered into force for sixteen Contracting Parties on
September 27, 2012. On that day, to ensure conformity with the judgment of the
German Federal Constitutional Court of September 12, 2012, representatives of the
Contracting Parties issued an interpretive declaration on articles 8(5), 32(5), 34, and
35(1) TESM, supra note 1. On October 4, 2012, Estonia was the final Contracting Party
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Meanwhile, the decision amending article 136 TFEU was still
pending approval by all twenty-seven Member States.99 So, when
the European Council, backed by the Member States and the
Commission, argued at the hearings that article 136(3) TFEU is
a purely declaratory provision, the contradiction with its earlier
assertion as to the necessity of the amendment was evident. The
Court nonetheless sided with the European Council. Referring
to earlier parts of the judgment, it merely stated that the
amendment of article 136 TFEU by the decision confirms the
existence of a power possessed by the Member States.100
Indeed, any other view on the legal significance of article
136(3) TFEU likely rests on the misconception that this
provision serves as a legal basis or authorization for the
establishment of the ESM. Seeing as the ESM Treaty was
concluded by the euro area Member States under public
international law, there was, in any event, simply no need for a
legal basis. Since the Court found that the right of a Member
State to conclude and ratify the ESM Treaty is not subject to the
entry into force of the decision,101 it is now also abundantly clear
that article 136(3) TFEU does not serve as an authorization for
the establishment of the ESM.102 Member States may have
limited their sovereign rights by transferring powers to the
Union, but their capacity to conclude treaties remains intact.
The fact that the ESM Treaty is in substance closely related to
to ratify the ESM Treaty. The ESM was inaugurated in the margins of a Eurogroup
meeting on October 8, 2012.
99. Decision 2011/199 did not as foreseen enter into force on January 1, 2013,
because the relevant bill was still awaiting Presidential approval in the Czech Republic,
despite having been approved by both houses of parliament. See Directorate General
for Internal Policies, Policy Department C, Article 136 TFEU, ESM, Fiscal Stability
Treaty—Ratification requirements and present situation in the Member States, Eur.
Parl. Doc. PE 462.455 (2013). The Decision eventually entered into force on May 1,
2013
100. Thomas Pringle v. Gov’t of Ireland, Case C-370/12, [2012] E.C.R. I____,
¶ 172 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012) (referring to paragraphs 68, 72, and 109).
101. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 185 (delivered November 27, 2012).
102. Note that the German Federal Constitutional Court holds a different view. In
its ESM ruling, that Court referred to article 136(3) TFEU as an “Öffnungsklausel” and
argued that the provision “opens up” to the euro area Member States the possibility of
establishing the ESM on the basis of an agreement under international law. See
Bundesverfassungsgericht [Bverfg] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 12, 2012, 2
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1390/12, ¶¶ 233,
236 (Ger.).
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the law of the EMU does not mean that it is formally part of the
EU legal order. Consequently, from an international law point
of view, the entry into force of the ESM Treaty was also not
contingent upon EU law. This is why it could precede the
amendment of article 136 TFEU.
This does not mean that the proposed insertion of article
136(3) TFEU was never more than an attempt by the German
government to placate the judges in Karlsruhe,103 or a message
to financial markets without legal added value. Writing prior to
the judgment, De Gregorio Merino suggested that article 136(3)
TFEU should be seen as a “provision of a fundamental
interpretative value” that provides legal certainty as to the
compatibility of the ESM with article 125 TFEU.104 The new
provision, he argued, would introduce the preservation of the
stability of the euro area as a new Treaty objective and reconcile
this with the objective of monetary stability founded on
budgetary discipline, as guaranteed by article 125 TFEU. As De
Gregorio Merino rightly noted, in the Union Treaties the term
‘stability’ was hitherto only used in relation to price stability.105
Article 136(3) TFEU did in fact prove to be a useful
interpretative tool, as the Court cleverly reconstructed the scope
of article 125 TFEU using terminology found in the yet-to-beinserted Treaty provision without explicitly referencing it.106
Seeing as articles 3 and 12(1) TESM mirror the wording of
article 136(3) TFEU, this made it especially easy for the Court to
positively assess the compatibility of the ESM Treaty with the
‘no-bailout’ clause.107 At the same time, this also means that
there is no longer a need to reconcile the two concepts of
stability. After all, the Court identified the preservation of the
financial stability of the monetary union as a “higher objective”

103. Nikolas Busse, EU-Vertrag: Ein Brüsseler Gipfel für die Karlsruher Richter,
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Dec. 17, 2010, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/
politik/europaeische-union/eu-vertrag-ein-bruesseler-gipfel-fuer-die-karlsruher-richter11079015.html.
104. De Gregorio Merino, supra note 67, at 1629.
105. Id.
106. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 136–37 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012). Instead,
the Court relied on the Opinion of the ECB, supra note 48, the wording of which was of
course directly inspired by Decision 2011/199.
107. Id. ¶ 142.
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of article 125 TFEU itself.108 Consequently, article 136(3) TFEU
is now bereft of any legal purpose besides confirming an already
existing power of the euro area Member States.
III. COMMENTS
Member States often display a schizophrenic attitude
towards EU law and the institutional arrangements laid down in
the Union Treaties when guarding their prerogatives as
sovereign states. This is most apparent in the area of economic
policy. The drafters of the Maastricht Treaty, hesitant to
relinquish powers to the Union, originally created a decidedly
asymmetric legal framework for the EMU. Whereas the euro
area Member States have fully transferred the sovereignty to
pursue monetary policy to the European System of Central
Banks (“ESCB”),109 articles 2(3) and 5(1) TFEU still “restrict the
role of the Union in the area of economic policy to the adoption
of coordinating measures.”110 The introduction to this Article
suggests that, in light of the judgment, it is perhaps more
appropriate to think of the EMU as an ‘Economic and/or
Monetary Union’ rather than an Economic and Monetary
Union. As Pringle shows, the compatibility of the ESM Treaty
with EU law hinges essentially on the characterization of
economic policy as a sui generis category of Union
competences.111 This final section will illustrate that the euro
area Member States are, however, to a great degree bound by
the Union Treaties. It will furthermore argue that a permanent
stability mechanism could also have been established as a Union
instrument and an explanation will be given as to why that
would have been preferable.

108. Id. ¶ 135.
109. See TFEU, supra note 2, arts. 3(1)(c), 127(2), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 51, 102;
Protocol (No. 4), supra note 56, art. 3(1), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 231.
110. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 64 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012).
111. Id. ¶¶ 64–66, 105, 168, 180. This characterization is not without its critics. It
has been argued that it does not adequately reflect reality and could be seen as an
attempt by the Member States to guard their (perceived) autonomy. See René Smits,
The European Constitution and EMU: An Appraisal, 42 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 425, 430–31
(2005) (citing Koen Lenaerts, The Structure of the Union According to the Draft Constitution
for Europe, in THE EUROPEAN UNION: AN ONGOING PROCESS OF INTEGRATION 3, 20
(Jaap W. de Zwaan et al. eds., 2004)).
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A. Euro Area Member States and the Debt Crisis: Free to Do as They
Please?
The economic policies of the Member States and the single
monetary policy are inextricably related. In a monetary union, a
Member State’s fiscal policy choices may have considerable
negative effects on the others. Therefore, Member States are
required to coordinate their economic policies within the
Union, notably on the basis of broad economic policy
guidelines112 within the context of the multilateral surveillance
procedure.113 In doing so, the Member States shall act in
compliance with three guiding principles: stable prices, sound
public finances, and a sustainable balance of payments.114 As
regards the principle of sound public finances, the disregard of
which arguably lies at the heart of the sovereign debt crisis,
article 126(1) TFEU unequivocally states that Member States
shall avoid excessive government deficits. To this end, article
126 TFEU lays down the excessive deficit procedure.115 A
protocol annexed to the Union Treaties sets the limits on
planned or actual government deficit (3% of GDP) and
government debt (60% of GDP).116 Already in 2003, this
framework, as augmented by the Stability and Growth Pact
(“SGP”), proved insufficiently strict to keep Member States in
line.117
The sovereign debt crisis painfully exposed the
shortcomings of the above-described legal framework. Efforts to

112. TFEU, supra note 2, art. 121(2), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 97.
113. The multilateral surveillance procedure is provided for in TFEU, supra note
2, art. 121(3)–(4), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 97–98. Further rules are contained in the
‘preventive arm’ of the Stability and Growth Pact (“SGP”). See Surveillance and
Coordination of Economic Policies, supra note 27.
114. TFEU, supra note 2, arts. 119(3), 120, 121(1), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 96–97.
115. The excessive deficit procedure is provided for in TFEU, supra note 2, art.
126(2)–(13), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 100–01. Further rules are contained in the ‘dissuasive
arm’ of the SGP. See Excessive Deficit Procedure, supra note 27.
116. See Protocol (No. 12) on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, 2012 O.J. C
326/279.
117. On the SGP, its ineffectiveness in the 2000s, and subsequent reforms, see
Matthias J. Herdegen, Price Stability and Budgetary Restraints in the Economic and Monetary
Union: The Law as Guardian of Economic Wisdom, 35 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 9 (1998);
Fabian Amtenbrink & Jakob de Haan, Economic Governance in the European Union: Fiscal
Policy Discipline Versus Flexibility, 40 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1075 (2003); Jean-Victor
Louis, The Review of the Stability and Growth Pact, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 85 (2006).
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reinforce economic governance within the euro area, such as
the European Semester, the Six-Pack, the Euro-Plus Pact, and
the Fiscal Compact Treaty, should be understood in this
context.118 More problematic in light of the urgently needed
financial assistance to Greece and other euro area Member
States, however, was the set of provisions immediately preceding
article 126 TFEU. The ostensibly strict prohibition of bailouts
was particularly troublesome. As Smits has put it, article 125
TFEU warns financial markets that “each Member State is ‘on its
own’ and not backed by implicit guarantees from the [Union]
or from fellow Member States.”119 Together with articles 123 and
124 TFEU, the ‘no-bailout’ clause was intended to ensure that
market forces exercise pressure on the borrowing activities of
Member States, necessitating budgetary discipline.120 As it
turned out, however, the markets proved unreliable to fulfill
their task as the final arbiters of euro area Member States’
financial health.121
There was no Union instrument in place for financial
assistance to euro area Member States when the crisis hit.122 The
1989 Delors Report had in fact suggested the possibility of
financial support based on conditionality, but the drafters of the
Maastricht Treaty did not follow up.123 However, it was clear
from the start of the crisis that the Member States were willing to
take coordinated action “to safeguard financial stability in the

118. For a discussion, see Dariusz Adamski, National Power Games and Structural
Failures in the European Macroeconomic Governance, 49 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1319
(2012).
119. RENÉ SMITS, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK: INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS 77
(1997).
120. Id.; Pipkorn, supra note 45, at 275.
121. Louis, supra note 41, at 979.
122. Article 143(2) TFEU, supra note 2, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 111, enables the
Union to grant mutual assistance, but only to Member States with a derogation (i.e.,
non-euro area Member States). Balance-of-Payments assistance for these Member States
has been made possible by Council Regulation No. 332/2002 on Establishing a Facility
Providing Medium-Term Financial Assistance for Member States’ Balances of
Payments, 2002 O.J. L 53/1 [hereinafter Medium-Term Financial Assistance for
Balances of Payments].
123. See JACQUES DELORS, COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF ECON. & MONETARY UNION,
REPORT ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 19, 35–36
(Apr. 17, 1989).
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euro area.”124 Confronted with limited resources under the EU
budget, the Union and the Member States subsequently resorted
to measures, which were “not wholly conventional.”125 The
financial assistance mechanisms they devised—successively, the
Greek Loan Facility, the EFSM, the EFSF, and the ESM—all
appeared to run counter to the above-described rationale
behind the ‘no-bailout’ clause. Yet, European Council President
Van Rompuy was tasked to investigate the possibilities of a
limited Treaty change “not modifying Article 125 TFEU” to
facilitate the establishment of the ESM.126 Commentators were
generally vexed the most, however, by the fact that the Member
States created the Greek Loan Facility, the EFSF, and the ESM
outside the framework of the Union Treaties. This gave the
impression they were circumventing fundamental provisions of
EU law through legal trickery. The Member States again took
the ‘intergovernmental route’ with the aforementioned Fiscal
Compact Treaty, which followed in early 2012. This led to
heightened criticism of their piecemeal approach to addressing
the roots of the debt crisis and the legal form their solutions
took.127
The Court’s judgment in Pringle is unlikely to mitigate such
sentiments. To the contrary, detractors will no doubt see the
judgment as further evidence of the erosion of the rule of law at
the European level. Yet, given the severity of the sovereign debt
crisis and the obvious political consensus among European
leaders as to the necessity of a permanent stability mechanism,
was it realistic to expect that the Court would strike down the
ESM Treaty? After all, at stake was the stability of the euro area
as a whole. This does not mean that the euro area Member
States can circumvent key EMU-related provisions, such as
124. See Statement by the Heads of State or Government of the Euro Area, March
25, 2010.
125. View of Advocate General Kokott, Thomas Pringle v. Gov’t of Ireland, Case
C-370/12, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 1 (delivered Oct. 26, 2012) (not yet published).
126. Eur. Council, Conclusions of October 18–19, 2010, at 2 (Nov. 2010), available
at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/
117496.pdf.
127. Telling in this respect is the title of a debate held at the European University
Institute. See Loïc Azoulai et al., Another Legal Monster? An EUI Debate on the Fiscal
Compact Treaty (Eur. Univ. Inst. Working Paper Law No. 2012/09). For a critique of the
Fiscal Compact Treaty, see also Paul P. Craig, The Stability, Coordination and Governance
Treaty: Principle, Politics and Pragmatism, 37 EUR. L. REV. 231 (2012).
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article 125(1) TFEU, by switching from the EU legal order to
legal regimes set up under public international law. Some
Member States did in fact argue that the ESM, as an
independent international organization, falls outside the
personal scope of application of article 125(1) TFEU.128 While
the Court did not address this particular argument, it appears to
follow the view of AG Kokott. She stressed that Member States
are required to comply with their obligations under EU law
when giving effect to commitments assumed under international
agreements. Accordingly, the euro area Member States are
bound by the requirements of article 125 TFEU also when they
act as ESM Members.129 Citing the same case law, the Court
affirmed that the euro area Member States may not disregard
their duty to comply with EU law when exercising their
competences to establish a permanent stability mechanism
outside the framework of the Union Treaties.130 In that regard,
the Court emphasized that article 136(3) TFEU ensures the
ESM will operate in a way that will comply with EU law.131
B. The Integrity of the EMU and the Use of International Agreements
The European Council has stated that the “next steps in the
process of completing EMU [are] based on deeper integration
and reinforced solidarity for the euro area Member States.”132
The establishment of the ESM was a serious first step towards the
institutionalization of solidarity amongst euro area Member
States after initial temporary financial assistance mechanisms
paved the way. In Pringle, the Court squared the euro area
Member States’ willingness and ability to provide stability
support with the rationale behind the ‘no-bailout’ clause.
Needless to say, this is a positive development. Further steps
currently under discussion in Brussels include the direct
recapitalization of banks by the ESM, a Single Resolution
128. View of Advocate General Kokott, Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 107
(delivered Oct. 26, 2012).
129. Id. ¶ 109 (citing Gottardo v. Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale
(INPS), Case C-55/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-413, ¶ 33).
130. See Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 69 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012).
131. Id.
132. Eur. Council, Conclusions of December 13–14, 2012, at 2 (Dec. 2012),
available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/
ec/134353.pdf.
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Mechanism, and a European Redemption Fund.133 Just like
solidarity, deeper integration comes at a cost. With the Six-Pack,
the Fiscal Compact Treaty, and now the Two-Pack,134 Member
States’ room to maneuver in the area of economic policy—in
particular when it comes to budgetary policy—is gradually scaled
back in an effort to minimize negative spillovers. Here, too, farreaching measures are currently under discussion. For example,
the Commission recently announced it will propose a framework
for ex ante coordination of major economic policy reforms in the
context of the European Semester, as envisaged by the Fiscal
Compact Treaty.135
Over the past three years, the EMU has been overhauled. It
is now common for policy-makers in Brussels to openly speak of
completing a “genuine Economic and Monetary Union.” Given
this development, it is striking that the Court adheres to a
minimalist view of the EMU that is increasingly becoming
outdated. As this Article illustrates, the Court drew a hard line
between monetary policy and economic policy in Pringle. It
separated the Monetary Union from the Economic Union with
surgical precision, acknowledging the exclusive competence of
the Union in the former and affording the euro area Member
States substantial freedom in the latter. Although it is fairly
obvious that the Court’s choice to allow for the ESM to be
established outside the Union framework was dictated by the
exceptional circumstances detailed above, one could reflect on
the consequences for the integrity of the EMU and the
constitutional character of the Union Treaties.
As was already argued in the Delors Report, the Monetary
Union and the Economic Union “form two integral parts of a
single whole.”136 Notwithstanding the insufficient availability of
133. For an overview, see Communication from the Commission: A Blueprint for
a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Union: Launching a European Debate,
COM(2012) 777 final/2 [hereinafter Commission Blueprint].
134. See Regulation 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the Strengthening of Economic and Budgetary Surveillance of Member States
Experiencing or Threatened with Serious Difficulties with Respect to Their Financial
Stability in the Euro Area, 2013 O.J. L 140/1; Regulation 473/2013 of the European
Parliament and of the Council on Common Provisions for Monitoring and Assessing
Draft Budgetary Plans and Ensuring the Correction of Excessive Deficit of the Member
States in the Euro Area, 2013 O.J. L 140/11.
135. Commission Blueprint, supra note 133, at 20–21, 42–45.
136. DELORS, supra note 123, ¶ 21.
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resources under the Union’s budget, the establishment of a
permanent stability mechanism within the framework of the
Union Treaties arguably would have better preserved the
integrity of the EMU than the arrangements currently in place.
Indeed, both the ECB and the European Parliament voiced
their preference for the ESM to be established as a Union
instrument rather than an intergovernmental mechanism.137
The Commission, at one point, also seemed to be of the opinion
that a permanent stability mechanism could be established on
the basis of the Union Treaties,138 though it did not defend this
position in Pringle for obvious reasons. However, the
Commission recently stressed that the deepening of the EMU
should be done within the Union Treaties and
‘intergovernmental solutions’ should only be considered on an
exceptional and transitional basis. It furthermore submitted that
the ESM could eventually be integrated into the EU Treaty
framework.139 But was there truly no possibility of establishing
the ESM as a Union instrument? The daunting prospect of
having to reach political agreement on an adjustment of the
Union’s budget—which would require the consent of all
Member States—likely had greater influence on the choice to
establish the ESM as an international organization than any
legal objections.
The Union Treaties contain at least two provisions that
could have been considered as a legal basis for the
establishment of the ESM as a Union instrument in combination
with the provisions on enhanced cooperation.140 However, in
Pringle, the Court explicitly ruled out one option, article 122(2)
TFEU. As was noted above, the Court considered that this
provision “does not constitute an appropriate legal basis for the
establishment of a stability mechanism of the kind envisaged by
137. See Opinion of the ECB, supra note 46, ¶ 8; European Parliament Resolution
of March 23, 2011 on the Draft European Council Decision Amending Article 136 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with Regard to a Stability
Mechanism for Member States Whose Currency Is the Euro, 2012 O.J. C 247 E/22,
¶ 14.
138. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 14 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012).
139. See Commission Blueprint, supra note 133, at 13, 33.
140. The procedure regulating enhanced cooperation is laid down in article 20
TEU, supra note 2, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 56–57, and articles 326 to 334 TFEU, supra note
2, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 189–92.
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[Decision 2011/199],” the objective of which is to “safeguard
the stability of the euro area as a whole.”141 From this rather
terse assessment we may gather that the Court finds the
permanent nature of the ESM to be incompatible with the
requirement in article 122(2) TFEU that financial assistance be
granted to a Member State in difficulties caused by exceptional
occurrences beyond its control.
Following this line of reasoning, the exceptional nature of
such occurrences allows only for temporary financial assistance.
However, stability support provided by the ESM is by definition
temporary, as the ESM can only grant support if indispensable
to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole
and of its Member States.142 Support should consequently cease
once financial stability of the recipient Member State (and the
euro area as a whole) has been secured. Therefore, stability
support provided by the ESM could just as easily be considered
compatible with article 122(2) TFEU in this respect. The
permanent nature of the mechanism that is used to provide
stability support does not change that.
One could further argue that the objective of safeguarding
the stability of the euro area as a whole, too, is compatible with
article 122(2) TFEU. The provision refers to a Member State—
singular—in difficulties or threatened with severe difficulties.
That should not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a
financial assistance mechanism cannot be established as a Union
instrument, though. After all, article 122(2) TFEU previously
served as the legal basis for the EFSM Regulation, which had an
even broader objective; namely, to preserve the financial stability
of the Union.143 It is worthy to note that the objective of the ESM
is not, as the Heads of State or Government have claimed and
the Court suggested,144 solely safeguarding the stability of the
euro area as a whole. The purpose of the ESM is to provide
stability support to the benefit of its Members if indispensable to
safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and
141. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 65 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012).
142. See TESM, supra note 1, arts. 3, 12(1).
143. See EFSM Regulation, supra note 18, art. 1.
144. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 65 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012); Preamble to
Decision 2011/199, supra note 9; European Council 16–17 Dec. 2010 Conclusions,
supra note 32, at 1.
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of its Member States.145 As the former objective can only be
achieved—at least within the limits of the ESM Treaty—by
contributing to the financial stability of individual Member
States, excluding article 122(2) TFEU as a possible legal basis for
a permanent stability mechanism seems overly formalistic.
Had it been decided to establish the ESM as a Union
instrument, the flexibility clause of article 352 TFEU would have
been an alternative option. In Pringle, the Court did not rule out
the possibility of establishing a permanent stability mechanism
on the basis of article 352 TFEU. It merely stated that the
availability of this provision as a possible legal basis does not
impose on the Union any obligation to act.146 The substantive
requirements article 352(1) TFEU places on the adoption of
appropriate measures by the Council, where the Union Treaties
have not provided the necessary powers to attain one of the
objectives set out therein, appear to have been fulfilled. With
reference to article 3(4) TEU, it could be argued that the
establishment of a permanent stability mechanism by the Union
would be necessary to preserve the stability of the euro area as a
whole. As the Court indicated in Pringle, maintaining the
financial stability of the Monetary Union can be identified as an
inherent objective of the Union Treaties.147
Can the Member States still have recourse to international
agreements when the Union Treaties also provide for the
possibility of the Union to take the same or similar action? The
Court’s Bangladesh case law, on which the Pringle judgment
builds,148 would suggest they can. Bangladesh concerned an act
adopted by the representatives of the Member States meeting
within the Council (i.e., an executive agreement under
international law), that was challenged by the European
Parliament. The Court ruled that the Member States are not
precluded from exercising their competence collectively in areas
in which the Union does not have exclusive competence.149 The
Court’s Bangladesh doctrine is premised on an international law
145. TESM, supra note 1, art. 3.
146. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 67 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012).
147. Id. ¶ 135.
148. See id. ¶ 69.
149. Parliament v. Council and Commission (Bangladesh), Joined Cases C-181/91
& C-248/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-3685, ¶ 16.
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approach to the issue of Member States concluding parallel
agreements between themselves outside the framework of the
Union Treaties and can indeed be defended from that
perspective. However, the use of parallel agreements in cases
where the Union could also have acted has been viewed with
some suspicion. It has been argued that the Member States, by
abandoning the framework of the Union Treaties, evade the
constitutional principles and guarantees enshrined therein.150
This latter approach, as opposed to the international law
approach, acknowledges the constitutional value of the Union
Treaties. Opting for the ‘intergovernmental route’ necessarily
has consequences for democratic and judicial control in the
Union. Even if the Member States do allocate tasks to the
Union’s institutions within the framework of the newly created
legal regime, they set the parameters within which the selected
institutions operate—not the Union Treaties. As such, the
conclusion of parallel agreements by the Member States could
even be considered at odds with the principle of sincere
cooperation.151
If one accepts that the ESM or a similar stability mechanism
could have been established on the basis of the Union Treaties
and that parallel agreements concluded between the Member
States go against the very idea of the Union Treaties having
constitutional value, the next question should be why EU law
should nonetheless allow the euro area Member States to
conclude partial agreements. In principle, partial agreements
(i.e., international agreements between smaller groups of
Member States outside the framework of the Union Treaties)152
are acceptable under certain circumstances. As long as they do
not disregard their duty to comply with EU law, Member States
should be able to conclude, for example, bilateral tax treaties or

150. Bruno de Witte, Chameleonic Member States: Differentiation by Means of Partial
and Parallel International Agreements, in THE MANY FACES OF DIFFERENTIATION IN EU
LAW 231, 265 (Bruno de Witte et al. eds., 2001).
151. TEU, supra note 2, art. 4(3), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 18. In Pringle, however, the
Court concluded that article 4(3) TEU does not preclude the euro area Member States
from concluding and ratifying the ESM Treaty, as the establishment of the ESM does
not infringe the provisions of the TFEU. See Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 151–52
(delivered Nov. 27, 2012).
152. The typology used here is derived from de Witte, supra note 150.
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seek further integration under the ‘Benelux clause.’153 Partial
agreements by a substantial group of Member States, however,
are not necessarily less detrimental to the integrity of the EU
legal order than parallel agreements. The drafters of the
Amsterdam Treaty seemed to have realized this when they
introduced the enhanced cooperation procedure and decided
to incorporate the Schengen acquis into the framework of the
Union Treaties.154 One could argue that the decision of all euro
area Member States to establish the ESM outside the framework
of the Union Treaties has exactly the same consequences for
democratic and judicial control, insofar as the EMU is
concerned, as a parallel agreement would have Union-wide.
As discussed above, the ESM makes use of the Union’s
institutions.155 Yet, democratic and judicial control over the ESM
is limited by the euro area Member States’ decision to step
outside the framework of the Union Treaties. For example, the
Commission cannot challenge acts adopted by the Board of
Governors before the Court on the basis of article 263 TFEU, as
the Council is formally not involved. While the Commission
could start infringement proceedings under article 258 TFEU,
that step is not lightly taken—especially against all seventeen
euro area Member States. As meetings of the Board of
Governors take place in the margin of Eurogroup meetings,
which are informal by definition,156 this significant and
controversial new area of EMU decision-making is essentially
detached from the Union’s institutional framework. Meanwhile,
the European Parliament was shut out from the process of
establishing the ESM altogether.157 What is more, neither the
Board of Governors nor the Troika can be held accountable to
the European Parliament. Had a permanent stability mechanism
been established as a Union instrument, on the basis of either

153. TFEU, supra note 2, art. 350, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 195.
154. See Helmut Kortenberg, Closer Cooperation in the Treaty of Amsterdam, 35
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 833, 835 (1998) (written under a pseudonym).
155. See supra Section II.B.4.
156. See Protocol (No. 14) on the Euro Group, 2012 O.J. C 326/283.
157. While the European Parliament was consulted on the amendment of article
136 TFEU, supra note 2, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 106, as required by article 48(6) TEU supra
note 2, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 42, the European Council did not take over any of the
amendments suggested by the European Parliament in its Opinion, supra note 137.
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article 122(2) or 352 TFEU, its involvement would at least have
been guaranteed.
One could speculate what the Court would have made of
the ESM Treaty had it been concluded under different
circumstances. For example, in the event that the euro area
Member States had deemed the establishment of the
mechanism an important precautionary measure in times of
economic stability. Imagine for a moment that the Commission
had started infringement proceedings against these Member
States, unlikely as that may seem. Facing similar legal questions,
would the Court have come to the same conclusions as it did in
Pringle or would it have sent the Member States back to the
drawing board? More than likely, Court watchers and Brussels
insiders would not have been as sure about the outcome of the
case as they were in November 2012.
CONCLUSION
In Pringle, the Court had to choose between putting the
stability of the euro area at risk—which arguably would have
been the result of strictly applying article 125 TFEU—and
reducing article 136(3) TFEU to an essentially superfluous
provision before it even entered the Treaty. Given the
circumstances, sacrificing article 136(3) TFEU was the only
reasonable option. Although the European Council initially
presented the first amendment of the Union Treaties since the
troubled ratification of the Lisbon Treaty as an instrumental
step in setting up the ESM, few will contest its current view that
the new provision is not that important after all. Meanwhile, the
‘no-bailout’ clause remains a key provision underpinning the
EMU; the ESM Treaty represents a serious first step towards the
institutionalization of solidarity within the euro area, but it has
not transformed the EMU into a transfer union. Importantly,
the Court’s inventive interpretation of the ‘no-bailout’ clause
leaves its original purpose intact. Financial assistance by means
of the ESM was explicitly made compatible with article 125
TFEU only if subject to strict conditionality. This temporarily
relieves recipient Member States from the disciplinary forces of
the market, but it nonetheless prompts them to implement
sound budgetary policies. Ultimately, that was what the ‘nobailout’ clause was supposed to ensure.
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The severity of the sovereign debt crisis has led to a broad
political consensus on the necessity of a permanent stability
mechanism in Europe, if not always on the size of the financial
assistance or the appropriateness of the drastic austerity
measures demanded from recipient Member States. Squaring
the euro area Member States’ willingness and ability to provide
stability support with the rationale behind the ‘no-bailout’
clause was no easy task. The Court should be applauded for
achieving this. Yet, at the same time, the Pringle judgment also
leaves the euro area Member States considerable freedom to
give their response to the sovereign debt crisis shape outside the
confines of the Union Treaties. While that is certainly
defendable and backed up by the Court with sound legal
reasoning, it has consequences for democratic and judicial
control in the Union.

